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First of all, I would like to express my deepest thanks to hostorganizations of this great conference for giving me a preciousopportunity to be here in Mongolia and speak on the topic of
vital importance of the Northeast Asia Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone
(NEA-NWFZ). It is my special honor and pleasure to talk on this topic
in Mongolia, a sole internationally recognized single state NWFZ. In
this respect, my gratitude goes to all the Mongolian participants,
especially friends from Blue Banner, including Ambassador Enkhsaikhan,
the key organizer of this conference.
Situation after the DPRK Nuclear Test
Before entering the details of my presentation, I want to mention
my personal view briefly on the situation of the Six Party Talks on the
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula after the 2006 October nuclear
test by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). The nuclear
explosion test by the DPRK was a serious setback for the regional peace
and security, but the 3rd session of the 5th Six Party Talks, which started
on February 8th 2007, restored the lost path leading to the
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, as it agreed to the initial actions
to implement the Joint Statement of September 19th 2005. This historic
Joint Statement states “The six parties unanimously reaffirmed that the
goal of the six-party talks is the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula in a peaceful manner,” and “The DPRK committed to
abandoning all nuclear programs and returning at an early date to the
NPT and to the IAEA safeguards.” Also the Joint Statement confirmed
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that “The 1992 joint declaration of the denuclearization of the Korean
peninsula should be observed and implemented.” Therefore, despite the
progress of the initial actions has been very slow since because of the
unexpected hardships in the handling of the DPRK’s fund frozen in Banco
Delta Asia, we can say we are now on the right track.
Another point to be emphasized at this point is that it is all the
more imperative that nuclear threats from any country should equally
eliminated and confidence of freedom from the nuclear threats are
impartially shared by all parties in this region. Recent developments, in
which some observers in Japan and Republic of Korea (ROK) argued
for the possible nuclear armament of Japan and the ROK, have clearly
demonstrated the necessity that the notion of the national security resting
on the nuclear arms must be universally prohibited in this region. Namely,
it is high time for us to pursue the way toward a Northeast Asia Nuclear-
Weapon-Free Zone (NEA-NWFZ).
The Three-Plus-Three Arrangement
Please take a look at the chronology table on the last page of my
paper. After the Cold War, a Northeast Asia NWFZ became more than
a political slogan. Several concrete proposals appeared as you see in the
table. We have already listened to the two speakers who are pioneers in
these efforts: Mr. Bernard Gourley from Professor Endicott’s group,
and Professor Kumao Kaneko presented his views including his
pioneering works. Learning these efforts and lessons, we proposed a
so-called “three-plus-three” arrangement of a NEA-NWFZ in 1996 as
a feasible and attainable approach. Eventually we proposed a Model
Treaty based on this arrangement at a workshop in the UN Headquarters
in New York, in cooperation with the ROK NGOs, with guest
commentators including Prof. Kaneko in 2004.
When we introduced the three-plus-three arrangement for the first
time, there existed no Six Party Talk yet on the denuclearization of the
Korean Peninsula. But we believed that in contemplating the situation
in Northeast Asia, this approach would be most realistic because it
recognizes the fundamental composition of the nations involved; namely
the DPRK, the ROK and Japan could take on the leading role in
establishing a geographical nuclear weapon-free zone, and the U.S.,
Russia and China could support these countries as nuclear-weapon states
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with strong security interests in the region. It is no accident that these
six nations became the members of the later Six Party Talks.
One of the merits with the three-plus-three arrangement is the three
non-nuclear weapon states can base their participation on their present
declared policies. In other words, the DPRK and the ROK can build on
the foundation of the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the
Korean Peninsula, which went into effect in 1992. The validity of the
Declaration was reaffirmed in February 2007, as I explained before. On
the part of Japan, it has its three non-nuclear principles (no production,
no possession, and no introduction of nuclear weapons) and its Atomic
Energy Basic Law prohibiting the military use of atomic energy (1955).
These could easily be extended to support a nuclear weapon-free zone.
A Model Treaty
The Model Treaty is by no means a finished document, but a basis
for further discussions and deliberations. The full text can be read at the
following URL.http://www.peacedepot.org/e-news/workingpaper1.pdf
. I want to explain some of its features and remaining issues.
(1) Six-Nation Treaty
The treaty would be signed by six nations with a three plus three
structure. The parties to the Treaty would be placed in two categories:
“Intrazonal States” (Japan, DPRK, ROK) and “Neighboring Nuclear
Weapon States” (China, Russia, U.S.). Geographically, the NEA-NWFZ
is composed of the territory of the former category of States. The two
categories of states parties have different fundamental obligations under
the treaty.
2) Obligations of the Intrazonal States
In addition to obligations common to the existing NWFZ treaties,
such as the prohibition of development, test, production or possession
of nuclear weapons, the Model Treaty has introduced two unique
obligations: “To eliminate all dependence whatsoever on any nuclear
weapon or any other nuclear explosive device in all aspects of its security
policy,” and “To exert effort for the diffusion of education worldwide
with regard to the urgency of nuclear disarmament, including the
transmission to the present and future generations of the facts on the
damage inflicted on the citizens and cities by the atomic bombs dropped
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in 1945.” The former is a progressive challenge and will be discussed
more in my separate presentation in the afternoon session. The latter is
reflecting the regional characteristic of the northeast Asia that is the
only region of the entire world where nuclear weapons have been used
in reality. In light of the fact that the Intrazonal States are home to
many A-bomb survivors, the treaty includes this obligation to educate
coming generations regarding nuclear disarmament and the damage to
humans and societies inflicted by nuclear weapons.
(3) Obligations of the Neighboring Nuclear Weapon States —
Security Assurances Built into the Treaty Body
Existing nuclear weapon-free zone treaties include negative security
assurance, the assurance for nuclear weapon states not to use or threaten
to use such weapons against non-nuclear states within the Zone, as
clauses in the protocol. In contrast, in the Model Treaty, they are
incorporated as requirements of the treaty itself because the Neighboring
Nuclear Weapon States are closely involved in the regional security and
the security assurances are considered to be one of the central concerns
to be addressed in a NEA-NWFZ treaty.
(4) Prior Consultation Arrangement for Transits or Calls of Ships
and Planes
All the existing NWFZ treaties leave the problem of ships or planes
suspected of carrying nuclear weapons entering ports or passing through
sea or air territory up to the individual parties directly involved.
Considering past protracted controversies on this subject, the Model
Treaty takes example by existing treaties, but takes it a step further and
incorporates an obligation of prior consultation in all such situations in
advance. Permission or denial of permission resulting from such
consultation is left up to the states parties involved, which should act in
compliance with the spirit of the Treaty. This arrangement follows the
current practice that the successive administrations of Japan claim to
have been taking up in relation to Japan’s non-nuclear three principles.
(5) Obligation to Cooperate with Energy
The 1992 Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula prohibits the possession of “nuclear reprocessing and uranium
enrichment facilities.” Many observers agree that application of such a
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prohibition to Japan would make it almost impossible to conclude the
treaty at an early date because it has already invested for such activities
for a long time as its national endeavor. However, the treaty might
perpetuate an obvious imbalance between Japan and the Koreas with
respect to securing energy unless some due consideration is taken
regionally or internationally. The Model Treaty recognizes the
importance of this problem and establishes the following obligation. “The
Intrazonal States shall pursue and develop cooperation among themselves
in good faith to secure stable and sustainable energy for each of the
Intrazonal States.”
(6) Some Remaining Issues
As I said earlier, the Model Treaty is a point of departure for further
discussion and deliberations. However, in giving shape to such a treaty,
several important unresolved issues have been demonstrated.
One major problem is an embodiment of verification system. The
verification system must fully utilize the capabilities of the IAEA. In
addition, we should develop a regional verification system in a way that
builds trust and cooperation among the nations of the region. The recently
agreed Central Asia NWFZ Treaty (Semipalatinsk Treaty) has become
the first treaty that adopts the provision to oblige state parties to conclude
with IAEA and bring into force not only full-scope safeguards but also
an Additional Protocol. Our model treaty follows suite to this example.
Nevertheless it is good idea to develop additional regional system to
complement international arrangement.
Another important issue is energy cooperation, and here we must
be content with initiating a wide-ranging discussion. Formulating an
agreement will take time and many obstacles must be overcome. I believe
the deliberation on the problem is closely related to the international
control of the nuclear fuel cycle that draws much attention recently.
Also, the matter of ships and aircraft suspected of carrying nuclear
weapons will clearly require deeper discussion and experiential exchange
within concerned researchers and citizens.
Although these issues and others are open for more deliberation, I
would like to emphasize that rapid establishment of even a minimal
Northeast Asia NWFZ will contribute greatly to peace and stability in
the region. In this context, I believe that the No.5 Working Group for
Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism set up in initial actions
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agreement at the Six Party Talk in February 2007 can be a reasonable
venue to start negotiations for a NEA-NWFZ.
Table 1.  CHRONOLGY
Proposals for a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone
March 
1995 
Endicott, et al. Limited N uclear Weapon-Free Zone (LN WFZ) 
applicable to non-strategic nuclear weapon only. 
C ircular LN WFZ consisting of a circular area with a 
2000-kilometer radius from a center point at the 
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) on the Korean Peninsula.  
Later, Elliptic LN WFZ with its major axis extending 
to part of Alaska 
1995 Andrew Mack N WFZ involving the RO K, DPRK, Japan and Taiwan 
March 
1996 
Kumao Kaneko C ircular N WFZ consisting of a circular area with a 
2000-kilometer radius from a center point at the 
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) on the Korean Peninsula. 
O bligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear weapon 
states within the zone would differ from each other. 
May 
1996 
H iromichi Umebayashi Three Plus Three Arrangement involving three non-
nuclear weapon states (RO K, DPRK, Japan) and three 
nuclear weapon states (China, Russia, US) 
O ctober 
1997 
Endicott, et al. LN WFZ involving non-nuclear weapon states (the 
RO K, Japan and Mongolia (DPRK) ) as a Phase I  
April 
2004 
H iromichi Umebayashi, 
et al. 
Model Treaty of Three Plus Three Arrangement 
